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Abstract 
The rapid rise of Chinese companies in the global economy has attracted great scholarly 
attention to Chinese corporate governance. Among the various areas of Chinese corporate 
governance, executive compensation is an important yet difficult part to research. The common 
research method of Chinese executive pay literature relies on pay figures disclosed in listed 
companies’ annual reports and tends to take the disclosed numbers at face value. This Article 
discusses three informal pay practices that constrain the usefulness and reliability of executive 
pay data formally disclosed in annual reports of Chinese listed companies, especially those 
owned by the state. A valid reading of formal pay figures entails an understanding of the network 
structure and the political environment in which Chinese companies operate. An investigation of 
the practices behind formal compensation numbers sheds light on many issues for scholars and 
policymakers, the salience of which escalates as the international interaction with Chinese 
companies expands. For example, it stresses the important role of political institutions in shaping 
executive compensation; it raises questions about the extent to which international cross-listing 
improves transparency of Chinese companies; it critically evaluates whether China’s latest 
reform policy deals with the real problems of its state-owned enterprises; it spotlights the lacuna 
of extant scholarship on Chinese executive compensation. 
Keywords:  executive pay, state-owned enterprise, business group, disclosure 
*Assistant Professor, University of British Columbia Peter A. Allard School of Law. She holds a PhD in sociology
from Columbia University and a JSD from the University of Illinois.
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Introduction 
China now ranks second behind the United States in number of the world’s largest 2,000 
public corporations on the Forbes list.
1
 The rapid rise of Chinese companies in the global
economy has drawn great scholarly attention to Chinese corporate governance. Scholars of 
comparative corporate governance however often observe significant limits of using standard 
theories or Western experience to understand Chinese companies. Among the various areas of 
Chinese corporate governance, executive compensation is an important yet difficult part to 
research. As the Economist aptly noted years ago, “How executives are rewarded is one of the 
many mysteries of China's increasingly powerful companies. Unravelling it is important, not 
least because it should help to explain corporate China's transformation from a state-controlled to 
a consumer-driven creature.”2
In the past decade a growing body of literature has tried to bring Chinese executive pay 
practices to light. Most studies of Chinese executive pay follow the conventional approach of 
Western compensation literature: taking the publicly-listed firm as the unit of observation, 
focusing on the listed firm’s pay figures disclosed in the annual report, and regressing the 
dependent variable of the disclosed pay amount on a set of independent variables such as 
revenues, profits, ownership type, etc.
3
 This typical approach produces useful insights, to be sure,
yet it is an under-contextualized approach to studying Chinese companies, particularly the state-
controlled firms. It overlooks the fact that a Chinese listed firm often is a member of a corporate 
group in which there are frequent intra-group transactions and personnel overlaps among 
1
 The Forbes Global 2000 is an annual ranking of the world’s top 2,000 public companies by Forbes 
Magazine. The ranking is based on a combination of four metrics: sales, profit, assets and market value. In 2016, the 
U.S. leads the list with 579 companies, followed by China (mainland and Hong Kong) with 232. Chinese companies 
own the top four spots and split the top ten spots with U.S companies. For the full list, see 
http://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/#tab:overall.  
2
 Executive Compensation in China: False Options, THE ECONOMIST, September 4, 2008 
http://www.economist.com/node/12070705.  
3
 See Section II for the review of this empirical literature. 
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member companies. The incentive systems of group-affiliated firms may be different from those 
of typical stand-alone firms considered in the Western executive pay literature.
4
 Moreover, this 
common approach relying on corporate annual reports assumes that China has effective 
enforcement of securities regulations and Chinese companies have a culture of compliance and 
truthful disclosure. This assumption should be accepted with caution. Chinese public companies 
and even the government itself have a notorious reputation of data manipulation.
5
 Big accounting 
firms in China have been embroiled in the scandals of accounting frauds.
6
 As Professor Donald 
Clarke notes, “the reality of corporate governance practices in China remains very different from 
what appears in the statute books, and indeed so opaque that it is difficult to measure reliably 
where it is, let alone in what direction it is moving.”7 It suggests nontrivial limits of using the 
standard methodology to capture the true picture of executive compensation in China.    
This Article focuses on three common practices that constrain the usefulness and 
reliability of executive pay data disclosed in Chinese listed companies’ annual reports: on-duty 
consumption, zero compensation, and nominal versus actual pay. In particular, this Article 
collects data to show the striking yet overlooked zero-pay puzzle presented in Chinse listed 
companies’ annual reports, where a considerably large proportion of board members of Chinese 
                                                          
4
 For literature on Chinese corporate groups showing how group affiliation affects affiliated firm’s financial 
performance and behavior, see Lisa Keister, CHINESE BUSINESS GROUPS: THE STRUCTURE AND IMPACT 
OF INTERFIRM RELATIONS DURING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2000); Michael Carney et al., Business 
Group Performance in China: Ownership and Temporal Considerations, 5 MGMT.& ORG. REV. 167 (2009). 
5
 Nina Xiang, Accounting Fraud Is Still Widespread Among Chinese Companies, FORBES, April 16, 2014, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ninaxiang/2014/04/16/accounting-fraud-is-still-widespread-among-chinese-
companies/#2eb89f88723e. After China Fraud Boom, Nasdaq Steps Up Scrutiny Of Shady Listings, MARKET 
WATCH, June 20, 2016 (reporting that “more than 50 U.S. listed Chinese companies were either delisted or halted 
from trading in 2011 and 2012 based on claims of fraud and other violations of U.S. securities laws”). Whether to 
Believe China’s GDP Figures, THE ECONIMIST, July 15, 2015, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/07/chinese-economy; Johnathan Chew, China Officials Admit 
They Fake Economic Figures, FORTUNE Dec. 14, 2015, http://fortune.com/2015/12/14/china-fake-economic-data/.   
6
 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), SEC Imposes Sanctions Against China-Based Members of 
Big Four Accounting Networks for Refusing to Produce Documents, press release of Feb. 6, 2015, 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-25.html.  
 7 Donald Clarke, “Nothing but WIND”?: The Past and Future of Comparative Corporate Governance, 59 
AM. J. COMP. L. 75, 101-02 (2010).  
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listed firms are reported to earn no compensation paid by the listed companies that they serve. To 
the best of author’s knowledge, this is the first systematic analysis of the zero-pay puzzle in 
extant scholarship. These three compensation practices lurking behind the formal numbers must 
be understood against a backdrop of regulatory slacks and corporate group structures being used 
to support the interests of the Chinese state-owner. China’s current securities regulations give 
listed companies freedom to mystify their top management compensation practices through the 
pervasive personnel linkages in a corporate group; and the mystification particularly serves the 
interests of the state-owner, who have been unwilling to relinquish control over the personnel of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  
These three compensation practices raise concerns about data comparability and 
reliability of Chinese listed companies’ annual reports. As shown in this Article, the data 
problems are not alleviated by cross-listing in better disclosure regimes such as the stock 
exchanges of the United States and Hong Kong. These informal pay practices also raise 
questions about whether executives of China’s listed firms are capable to discharge their 
fiduciary duties to the listed firms they serve.  
Furthermore, observing the pay practices behind the formal numbers published in 
corporate annual reports offers a nuanced view on the perennial scholarly debate about the 
trajectory of national corporate governance systems in the age of globalization. It suggests that 
politics play an important role in the formal rules and actual practices of executive compensation. 
It also offers an insightful perspective to evaluate China’s recent SOE reform agenda.   
In China, the term “executives” or “top managers” (gaoguan) usually includes directors, 
supervisors, the general manager (CEO), deputy general managers (vice CEOs), the financial 
officer, the corporate secretary and others described in the articles of incorporation. This 
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common usage considers the fact that directors and supervisors are usually corporate senior 
managers.
8
 To be consistent with China’s common usage, “executive compensation” referred in 
this Article includes compensation for directors, supervisors, and other top managers.  
This Article is organized as follows. Section I will set out the existing regulatory 
framework of executive compensation China. It helps explain how the formal regulatory rules 
make the mystification of executive pay possible.  Section II will review existing scholarly 
studies of Chinese executive compensation to show what sorts of pay information are typically 
examined in existing literature. Section III will discuss three informal pay practices that render 
compensation information disclosed in the corporate annual report significantly incomplete or 
misleading. Finally, Section IV discusses theoretical and policy implications as well as questions 
for future research.       
 
I. The Formal Rules of Executive Compensation  
Executive compensation in China is regulated by four legal sources: the company law, 
securities regulations for listed companies, special rules for financial institutions and rules for 
state-controlled firms.  An overview of the legal sources provides a backdrop to understand how 
actual compensation practices deviate from the formal rules and how the formal rules play a role 
in concealing actual practices.  
A. The Company Law 
China’s 2006 Company Law is the fundamental legal source of Chinese corporate 
governance. A major governance feature under China’s corporate law is the dual board structure, 
which consists of the board of directors and the board of supervisors. Figure 1 below shows the 
                                                          
8
 Lin Lin, Regulating Executive Compensation in China: Problems and Solutions, 32 J. L. & COMM. 207, 
212 (adopting the same definition of “executives” in the Chinese context).  
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governance structure under China’s corporate law. The function of the board of directors is 
similar to the board in the Anglo-American corporate system. The board of directors is 
responsible for managing the corporation’s business and affairs, including the appointment of 
senior officers and the determination of their compensation.  The board of supervisors is 
responsible for supervising directors and senior officers in performing their duties. Both boards 
are elected by shareholders, who are entitled to receive periodic disclosure of executive 
compensation paid by the company and have the authority to approve the compensation of 
directors and supervisors at the general shareholder meeting.
9
  
Figure 1.  Governance Structure under China’s Company Law 
 
B. Securities Regulations for Listed Companies 
 The China Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is the main government 
agency overseeing listed companies in China. CSRC’s Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies (2002) suggests that a listed company may establish the compensation committee to 
study and review the company’s remuneration policies for directors and senior officers.10 It also 
suggests that the board of directors should disclose compensation information to shareholders. 
                                                          
9
 The Company Act of China (2006), §§ 38 & 47. 
10
 The Company Act of China (2006), §§ 52 & 56; Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in 
China, (Zhengjianfa No.1 of 2002), available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69223.html.    
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While in the early 1990s China’s securities regulations already required listed companies to 
disclose executive compensation in their annual reports, most listed companies in fact did not 
comply with the rules.
11
 In 1999, CSRC promulgated a new rule which required the listed 
company to disclose in its annual report the lump sum of compensation paid to its directors, 
supervisors and senior officers; and the company was required to list all the directors, 
supervisors and senior officers who did not receive compensation from the company.
12
 While 
this disclosure rule had no compliance problems, the lump sum approach provided very limited 
information to understand each individual executive’s compensation.  
The compensation disclosure rules were amended in 2001.
13
  The 2001 amendment 
required disclosure of executive pay policies. Moreover, instead of lumping directors’, 
supervisors’ and senior officers’ compensation all altogether, the rules required the listed 
company to disclose the sum of the top three paid directors and the sum of the top three paid 
officers respectively. Independent directors’ compensation should be disclosed on an individual 
basis. The listed company was required to list executives who did not receive any compensation 
from the company and indicated whether or not they received any pay from its shareholders or 
subsidiaries. This disclosure rule implied that top managers were allowed to be paid by the listed 
company’s shareholders or affiliates rather than by the listed company itself. Yet how much 
compensation paid by the listed company’s affiliates was not subject to disclosure.           
                                                          
11
 Gupiao Faxing yu Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Administrative Regulations on Stock 
Issuance and Trading] (1993), §59. 
12
 Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Xinxi Pilu de Neirong yu Geshi Zhunze Dierhao <Niandu Baogao de 
Neirong yu Geshi> [Public Companies’ Disclosure Content and Format Rules No. 2 <Content and Format of Annual 
Reports> ] (1999).   
13
 Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Xinxi Pilu de Neirong yu Geshi Zhunze Dierhao <Niandu Baogao de 
Neirong yu Geshi> [Public Companies’ Disclosure Content and Format Rules No. 2 <Content and Format of Annual 
Reports> ] (2001) § 26. 
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In 2005, CSRC amended the disclosure rules resulting in mandatory disclosure of each 
executive’s compensation.14  The disclosure scheme included two parts: the total compensation 
and the current equity holdings. The total compensation is the sum of base salary, bonuses, 
subsidies, employee benefits, insurance and other forms of compensation paid by the company. 
The rules maintained the position that the listed company should list executives who did not 
receive any pay from the company and should indicate whether or not they received 
compensation from the company’s shareholders or subsidiaries. Still, how much compensation 
paid by the company’s affiliates remained undisclosed. The most current disclosure rules 
(released in 2016) are virtually the same as the rules of 2005.
15
  
C. Rules for Financial Institutions 
  In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, the Chinese government tightened its 
control over executive compensation of the financial sector, which has been dominated by SOEs.  
In 2009, the Ministry of Finance placed an annual pay cap at RMB 2.8 million (approximately 
$410 thousand in USD)
 16
 for executives at state-controlled financial institutions; moreover, it 
promulgated rules to strengthen the link between pay and performance. The China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) also published guidelines to regulate executive pay practices of 
China’s financial institutions (including policy banks, commercial banks, financial assets 
management companies, financial cooperatives, and finance companies, etc.), whether state-
                                                          
14
Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Xinxi Pilu de Neirong yu Geshi Zhunze Dierhao <Niandu Baogao de 
Neirong yu Geshi> [Public Companies’ Disclosure Content and Format Rules No. 2 <Content and Format of Annual 
Reports> ] (2005) § 26. 
15
Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Xinxi Pilu de Neirong yu Geshi Zhunze Dierhao <Niandu Baogao de 
Neirong yu Geshi> [Public Companies’ Disclosure Content and Format Rules No. 2 <Content and Format of Annual 
Reports> ] (2016) §53, available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgf/xxpl/xxplnr/201701/P020170111425807651253.pdf.  
16
 The official historical average exchange rate of USD to Renminbi for the year of 2009 is 1:6.831.   
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owned or not.
17
 According to the guidelines, the structure of executive compensation should 
include fixed salary, variable pay (i.e., performance-oriented compensation and short-term and 
long-term incentives) and benefits (e.g. housing subsidies). The guidelines set out details of 
executive compensation management. For instance, the base salary should be no more than 35% 
of the total compensation and 40% of performance bonus should be paid on a deferral basis with 
the deferral period not less than three years. Financial institutions that fail to comply with the 
guidelines would be subject to sanctions imposed by CBRC.  
D. Rules for Non-Financial SOEs 
At present, China’s largest non-financial SOEs are controlled by the central or local 
government’s ownership agency, known as the State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC). The large non-financial SOEs under SASAC’s control 
are typically organized as vertically-integrated business groups. Figure 2 illustrates the 
organizational structure of a typical business group under SASAC’s control.18  The parent 
company typically is 100 per cent owned by SASAC. Beneath the parent company are a large 
number of subsidiaries including listed firms, finance companies, research institutes and many 
other related firms along the production chain. Often there are frequent business transactions and 
personnel overlaps among member firms in a group. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 Shangye Yinhang Wenjian Xinchou Jianguan Zhiyin [Supervision Guidelines on Healthy Compensation 
of Commercial Banks], CBRC〔2010〕No. 14 (Feb. 21, 2010). 
18
 For a detailed discussion on the organization and governance of the business groups under SASAC’s 
control, see  Li-Wen Lin and Curtis J. Milhaupt, We are the (National Champions): Understanding the Mechanisms 
of State Capitalism in China, 65 STANFORD L. REV. 697 (2013). 
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Figure 2. Typical Structure of a Non-Financial State-Owned Group 
 
SASAC is authorized by the State-Owned Enterprise Assets Act (a special law outside 
the company law) to determine managerial compensation of the company under its direct control, 
i.e. the parent company in Figure 2.
19
 Since its establishment in 2003, SASAC in cooperation 
with relevant government and party organs has introduced a series of measures to reform the 
parent company’s executive compensation.20 Some important measures include: managerial 
compensation structure consist of base salary, bonus, and mid-term and long-term incentives 
which are linked with corporate performance; executive pay pegged to the average worker’s pay 
at certain fixed rate;
21
 using sophisticated formula to determine the pay level based on a set of 
economic, social, environmental and political indicators.
22
   
                                                          
19
 Qiye Guoyou Zichan Fa [State-Owned Enterprise Assets Act] (2008), Chapter 4. 
 
20
 The regulations usually were promulgated jointly with the Organization Department of the Chinese 
Communist Party (i.e., the Party’s human resources department), the Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security, the Ministry of Finance, National Audit Office, the Ministry of Inspection and SASAC.  
21
 According to SASAC’s 2009 guidelines, base salaries should not be more than 5 times of SOEs’ average 
worker’s pay in prior year and performance bonuses should not be more than 3 times of base salaries; in other words, 
the total compensation including base salaries and performance bonuses should be no more than 20 times of SOEs’ 
average worker’s pay. The original text of the guidelines (Guanyu Jinyibu Guifan Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren 
Xinchou Guanli de Zhidao Yijian [Guidelines Concerning Further Regulating Executive Compensation of the 
Central State-Owned Enterprises]) was never unpublished to the public; but a summary and inside information is 
available in People’s Daily, an official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party. See Pay for Senior SOE 
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Recently, the government’s anti-corruption campaign has escalated the SOE pay reform. 
In 2014, the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee, presided by 
President Xi Jinping, passed a set of rules to reform SOE executive pay.
23
 Top managers 
(including directors, supervisors, CEOs and vice CEOs) of the SOEs directly owned by SASAC 
(i.e. the parent company in Figure 2) are subject to the new rules.
24
 The government’s reform 
statement reaffirms the use of performance-oriented pay and prohibits illegal financial income.
25
   
E.  Evaluation 
The brief overview of China’s executive compensation rules shows that government 
intervention is quite direct and pervasive. Mandatory disclosure, a common form of government 
intervention in executive compensation, indeed exists in China. But the depth of information 
disclosure is relatively limited compared to the disclosure standards in advanced capital markets 
such as the United States. Disclosure of each executive’s compensation was not required until 
2005. Still, the scope of executive compensation remains vague and it does not require disclosure 
of a breakdown of compensation composition. It raises questions about comparability of 
compensation data across companies in China.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Executives Capped at 20 Times Average Employee Pay, People’s Daily, September 25, 2009, at 
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/10113071.html.  
22
 SASAC, Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Jingying Yeji Kaohe Zanxing Banfa [Provisional Measures on the 
Comprehensive Evaluation of Top Managers of the Central State-Owned Enterprises], Decebmer 29, 2012, available 
at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1566/n257060/n257203/15124088.html.  
23
 Zhongyang Guanli Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Zhidu Gaige Fangan [Reform Scheme on Executive 
Compensation of the Central State-Owned Enterprises]; Guanyu Heli Queding bing Yange Guifan Zhongyang Qiye 
Fuzeren Luzhi Daiyu , Yewu Zhichu de Yijian [Opinions on Rationalizing and Strictly Regulating Position-Related 
Treatments and Business-Related Expenses of Top Managers of the Central State-Owned Enterprises], passed by the 
Central Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China on August 29, 2014.  A summary of the rules is available 
on the website of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of China, 
http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/dongtaixinwen/buneiyaowen/201409/t20140903_139627.htm.  
24
 While the rules are applicable to the SOEs under SASAC’s control, the government explicitly 
encouraged all central and local SOEs adopt similar rules. As a result, many local governments recently have taken 
similar steps to curb executive pay at their SOEs. 
25
 While a brief summary of the pay reform policy has been released by the government, until today the full 
text of the rules remains unpublished to the public. 
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Another problem involves the permissibility that executives may receive no 
compensation from the listed company but from its shareholders or subsidiaries. The regulations 
only require the listed company to disclose “whether or not” executives receive pay from its 
affiliates. The amount of compensation actually paid by the listed company’s affiliates is not 
subject to disclosure. Section III will empirically show that the business group structure coupled 
with this regulatory slack lead to the zero-pay phenomenon, significantly masking the actual 
compensation practices in China.       
The most silent government intervention is that the state itself directly determines the pay 
level in SOEs. As discussed above, the government has imposed a maximum amount of 
executive compensation on SOEs. Moreover, by virtue of the State-Owned Enterprise Assets Act, 
the state-owner authorizes itself the power to determine not only directors’ compensation but 
also compensation of senior officers such as CEOs and vice CEOs. In other words, the state-
owner has a super control right that is unavailable under the corporate law where shareholders 
have authority to determine director remuneration yet the board of directors approves 
compensation for senior officers.  
In fact, the state-owner not only legitimates its intervention through the special law, its 
involvement is more penetrating than what the law appears to be. As Section III will show, 
SASAC’s compensation power effectively reaches down to the listed subsidiaries, rather than 
restricted to the parent company as proclaimed in the law. By leveraging the complex corporate 
group structure and complementary disclosure rules, the state-owner effectively conceals actual 
SOE compensation practices notwithstanding mandatory disclosure of each executive’s 
compensation paid by the listed firm. 
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II. The Numbers Scrutinized in the Spotlight 
Empirical analysis is essential in understanding executive compensation. Without 
compensation data, it is impossible to systematically observe the pay level, composition and the 
relationship between pay and performance. Using empirical methods to analyze executive 
remuneration data is the main approach both in Western and Chinese executive pay literature. As 
discussed in Section I, starting in 1999, China’s listed companies began to disclose the sum of 
top three paid directors and the sum of top three paid senior officers; and starting in 2005, they 
should disclose in the annual report the compensation of each director, supervisor and senior 
officer. These disclosure rules triggered the takeoff of Chinese executive pay research.  
Existing Chinese executive pay literature, both in Chinese and English, typically 
concerns two related empirical questions: whether there is a positive relationship between pay 
and firm performance; and if yes, what the determinants of pay-performance sensitivity are. The 
extant studies tend to find a positive relationship between executive pay and performance, while 
significance and magnitude of the positive linkage vary with performance measures and sample 
periods.  Often studies investigate how corporate governance attributes such as ownership 
concentration, ownership identity (e.g., state-owned or not), and board structure (e.g. board size, 
number of independent directors) affect pay-performance sensitivity, and the results seem 
inconclusive.  
Regardless of their research questions, all the studies need to measure executive 
compensation.  Because of general quality concerns about Chinese academic journals, this 
Article will focus on the studies published in English scholarly journals. A summary of pay 
variables and data periods in major English studies of Chinese executive compensation is 
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provided in Appendix. The summary is not intended to serve as a comprehensive literature 
review but to show existing studies’ common approaches to measuring executive compensation.  
 As shown in Appendix, early studies relied on survey data to examine Chinese SOEs’ 
executive compensation practices in the 1980s. The sample companies in these early studies 
were non-listed companies because China’s stock exchanges had not been established until the 
early 1990s.  All the other studies focus on listed firms, and their study periods start from 1999 
or thereafter due to data availability made by mandatory compensation disclosure rules. Most of 
the existing studies focus on cash compensation (i.e. salary and bonus) rather than equity as 
Chinese listed firms rarely use equity incentives. The pay variable of studies covering the years 
prior to 2005 is typically measured as the sum or the average of the three highest-paid senior 
officers or directors; the pay variable of studies that focus on 2005 or after use individual 
executive pay. This measurement pattern reflects data availability under the disclosure rules.  
Clearly, most studies focus on cash compensation while only few studies examine 
perquisites. Perquisites typically include housing subsidies, travel reimbursement, entertainment 
expenses, etc. The limited investigation of perquisites is due to the fact that Chinese listed 
companies are not required to disclose such information.    
No matter how scholars measure executive compensation (cash, equity or perks), they 
typically take the listed firm as a stand-alone unit of analysis. Executive compensation is 
analyzed as an outcome of the listed firm’s internal governance such as the percentage of 
independent directors on the board, chairman-CEO duality, the existence of compensation 
committee, or shareholder identity (e.g. state or non-state).  
Overall, extent empirical studies focus on cash compensation disclosed in the corporate 
annual report. While this approach produces insights, there remain great limitations of 
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understanding actual managerial compensation practices of Chinese listed companies. As Section 
III will show, there are simultaneously under-, over- and non-reporting problems in Chinese 
listed firms’ executive compensation disclosure. The numbers disclosed in the corporate annual 
report should be taken cautiously rather at their face value. 
   
III. The Practices Hidden in the Shadow 
This section analyzes three disclosure practices peculiar to China’s ownership structure 
and compensation regulations that mask actual executive pay of Chinese listed companies, 
particularly state-controlled firms. The first practice is the non-disclosure of perks or so-called 
“on-duty consumption.” Because some existing studies have recognized on-duty consumption, it 
will simply give a brief discussion of its institutional causes. Attention will be focused on the 
other two practices that are overlooked in the extant literature. The second practice is the zero-
compensation phenomenon where a large number of directors and supervisors do not receive any 
compensation from the listed company they serve. The third practice concerns the gap between 
actual and nominal pay.  
A. On-Duty Consumption 
On-duty consumption (zaizhi xiaofei) is an important source of income for Chinese SOE 
executives. It involves various benefits enjoyed as a result of one's position. Typical benefits 
include housing allowance, personal use of corporate cars, shopping vouchers, travel expenses, 
and entertainment expenditures. The true amount of perk consumption is difficult to estimate 
because China’s listed companies are not required to disclose such information. Even if disclosed 
at all, perk consumption is likely underreported or significantly obscured. A conservative 
estimate suggested that perks could range between 15 and 32 percent of the total executive 
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compensation in China.
26
  Another study suggested that the average managerial perks could be as 
high as eight times of the average cash pay.
27
   
Despite the significance of perks in Chinese executive compensation, very few studies 
focus on perks because of data unavailability.  Chinese listed companies are not required to 
disclose information on executive perks. Less than 50 percent of the listed firms voluntarily 
disclosed such expenses; and even if they did, the disclosed information was in a lump-sum 
format where shareholders could not distinguish legitimate corporate operating expenses from 
managerial personal benefits.
28
 Therefore, most scholars focus on the observable data (i.e. salary 
and bonus) rather than the unobservable (i.e. perks).  
The use of on-duty compensation in SOEs traces back to the traditional compensation 
system. Before the economic reform starting in the 1980s, all enterprises were state-owned and 
managers’ compensation was subject to the civil service pay system. The system was based on 
egalitarianism in which there were little salary differentials between ordinary workers and high- 
rank employees.
29
 Yet government employees above a certain rank could receive considerable 
rank-specific perks. While in 1985 the SOE pay system separated from the government pay 
system, no-duty consumption remains as a significant hidden pay component for SOE executives.  
Because on-duty consumption is off-sheet income and subject to little monitoring, it has been 
criticized as a major source of corruption in the SOE system. The Chinese government very 
recently in the anti-corruption campaign made high-profile regulations to restrain the abuse of 
                                                          
26
 Takao Kato and Cheryl Long, Executive Compensation, Firm Performance and Corporate Governance 
in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, 54 Economic Development 
and Cultural Change 945, 961 (2006).  
27
 Donghua Chen et al. Do Managers Perform for Perks?, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562003 (March 1, 
2010). 
28
 Martin J. Conyon et al., Organizational Slack, CEO Turnover and the Horizon Problem in China, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2355744 (March 10 2016) at p.20, fn 3 (arguing the limits of 
using voluntarily disclosed perk-related expenditures to estimate the true amount of perks).  
29
 For detailed discussion on China’s civil pay system, see Hon S. Chan, How Are They Paid? A Study Of 
Civil Service Pay In China, 77 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 294 (2011). 
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on-duty consumption in the SOEs.  The regulatory rules limit the scope of on-duty consumption 
to certain qualified expenditures.
 30
 The effects of the recent rules are in question given that 
similar regulatory rules have already been in place for a decade.
31
  
Critically speaking, the government’s existing reform on on-duty consumption has only 
scratched the surface of the problem. The fundamental problem of on-duty consumption lies not 
in extravagant expenditures, but in the government’s (precisely the Chinese Communist Party’s) 
unwillingness to let go its control over SOE personnel. My previous work has shown that the 
Chinese government frequently rotates people between government bureaus and SOEs as an 
important way to control the management of SOEs.
32
 The common personnel linkages inevitably 
make government officials a group of peers for SOE executives. As a result, a SOE executive’s 
pay is implicitly benchmarked against the pay of a government official of equivalent rank, whose 
pay structure has a very low salary but considerable perks.
33
 As mentioned above, the amount of 
on-duty consumption is rank-specific, depending on one’s administrative rank (xinzheng jibei) in 
the government system.  For example, ministers enjoy the perks of the ministerial level. Since 
1999 the Chinese government has made several regulatory attempts to abandon administrative 
rank for SOEs, but the rules have been effectively disregarded.
34
  The largest five state-owned 
                                                          
30
 Guanyu Heli Queding bing Yange Guifan Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Luzhi Daiyu , Yewu Zhichu de 
Yijian [Opinions on Rationalizing and Strictly Regulating Position-Related Treatments and Business-Related 
Expenses of Top Managers of the Central State-Owned Enterprises], passed by the Central Political Bureau of the 
Communist Party of China on August 29, 2014.  In the Opinions, position-related treatments include the use of 
corporate vehicles, corporate housing, and training (including training at the Chinese Communist Party School and 
administrative academy but explicitly excluding MBA or EMBA tuitions). Business-related expenses include 
expenses for customer entertainment, travel, and telecommunication.   
31
 SASAC, Guanyu Guifan Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Zhiwu Xiaofei de Zhidao Yijian[Guidelines on On-
Duty Consumption of Top Managers of the Central State-Owned Enterprises](2006). 
32
 Li-Wen Lin, State Ownership and Corporate Governance in China: An Executive Career Approach, 
2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 743 (2013) (investigating the CEO career paths of Chinese SOEs and finding that 
generally more than 20% of the CEOs spent some time in government bureaus before their CEO appointments). 
33
 Chan, supra note 29. 
34
 The 15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party passed a resolution (Guanyu Guoyou Qiye 
Gaige he Fazhan Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding [Resolution on Several Important Questions Concerning SOE 
Reform and Development]) to abandon administrative ranks for enterprises and their top managers. In 2000, the 
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banks and the largest three state-owned oil companies, for example, hold vice-ministerial rank in 
the government system. The use of administrative rank in SOEs allows a unified career platform 
for government officials and SOE managers. It efficiently interprets the meaning of a transfer 
(promotion, lateral move or demotion) and associated benefits for a rotation between SOEs and 
other government units. While the legal pay of an SOE executive is higher than that of an 
equivalent-rank official, it is significantly lower than that of executives of privately-owned or 
foreign enterprises, another peer group for compensation determination. This sharp pay gap 
instigates a feeling of unfairness and adds fire to SOE executives’ unscrupulous extraction from 
covert on-duty consumption. (As opposed to the clandestine nature of on-duty consumption, 
salary offers relatively limited room to maneuver because salary is formally budgeted and for 
public companies it is disclosed to the public). Any pay reform short of actual delinking of the 
SOE personnel from the civil service system is ineffective to cure the endemic problem of on-
duty consumption in China’s SOEs.  
 
B. The Zero-Pay Puzzle 
In China, like the United States, the public discourse on executive compensation is 
focused on excessive pay. While Chinese executives are paid only a fraction of compensation 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
State Council also issued a notice to abandon administrative ranks for SOEs. However, the government decisions 
were not actually implemented. This was also true for listed SOEs. In 2006, the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
conducted a survey of the SOEs listed on the stock exchange to investigate whether the executives retained any 
administrative rank. The result showed that about 60% of executives of the listed central SOEs retained 
administrative rank. See Shanghai Stock Exchange Research Center, China Corporate Governance Report (2006): 
The Corporate Governance of State Holding Listed Companies. Very recent news reports also suggest that 
administrative rank remains a living institution in SOEs. See Huihau Nie, Zhongguo Guanyuan Jibie de Zhengzhi 
Luoji [The Political Logic of Chinese Government Officials’ Administrative Rank], FINANCIAL TIMES (Chinese), 
September 8, 2015,  http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001063796?full=y;  Xingjie Chen, Feichu Guoqi Lingdao 
Xingzheng Jibie? Dou Ni Wan er  [Abandoning Administrative Rank in SOEs? Just Kidding You], Sohu Finance, 
News New Perspectives  Vol. 785, Oct. 10, 28, 2013, http://business.sohu.com/s2013/others786/; Henshue Suo, 
Guozi Gaoguan Diaoyan: Chao 99% Buyuan Fangqi Xingzheng Jibie Huan Gaoxin [A Survey on SOE Executives 
Shows 99% Unwilling to Give Up Administrative Rank for Higher Compensation], China Business Journal, Issue 
2075, September 1, 2014,  http://news.cb.com.cn/html/economy_9_19746_1.html (reporting a survey result by the 
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of China). 
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earned by their Western counterparts,
35
 the public outcry over high executive pay is by no means 
less furious in China. As discussed in Section I, the Chinese government recently has taken 
measures to slash executive compensation in SOEs. High executive compensation is ill-tolerated 
in China not simply because of the weak connection between pay and performance, but more 
importantly, the worsening of social inequality and corruption. A handsome pay becomes 
something not for an executive to be proud of, but to be questioned. High-paid executives now 
may even stand in the spotlight of shame.   
In contrast to eye-catching high compensation, pay as low as zero has been largely 
unnoticed in extent literature. A perusal of the compensation data in the corporate annual reports 
reveals that a significant number of top managers particularly directors and supervisors report 
their compensation as zero. These zero-pay executives do not receive any compensation in cash 
or equity from the listed company that they serve. This section first presents the data on the scale 
of the zero-pay phenomenon and then it explains the underlying causes and implications.  
i. The Scale of the Zero-Pay Phenomenon 
 
This Article collects executive compensation data and relevant information from the 2014 
annual reports of the companies listed on China’s two stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
36
 The dataset includes 2,621 listed companies.  
Table 1 shows compensation and shareholding data by ownership type and management position. 
                                                          
35
 In 2014, the average CEO pay of the listed firms in China was 2.03 million RMB (approximately 326 
thousand USD) according to Forbes (China Edition). See Top 10 Mainland Ceos With Best Pay, CHINA DAILY, 
July 28, 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2015-07/28/content_21424926.htm. The average CEO pay of 
S&P 500 firms in the United States was $13.5 million. See AFL-CIO, Executive Pay Watch,   
http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/Paywatch-2015.   
36
 The raw data were mainly collected from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ), a commercial database that 
contains comprehensive information about ownership and executive compensation of China’s listed companies. 
Moreover, this Article directly extracted information from corporate annual reports to confirm data accuracy. In 
China, there are many free online financial databases that provide comprehensive information of Chinese listed 
companies. The Article downloaded annual reports from Sina.com and Stockstar.com. The data were compiled and 
analyzed with the assistance of computer programs. The listed companies published their 2014 annual reports 
sometime in 2015. This Article completed the data collection in January 2016. 
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The zero-pay phenomenon exists mainly for directors and supervisors, rather than CEOs. Still 
note that six percent of the CEOs of the SOEs controlled by the central government do not earn 
any compensation paid by the listed companies they serve. In contrast to CEOs, zero-pay 
directors and supervisors are strikingly prevalent. Table 1 shows that 65.3% (61.2%+4.1%) of 
the central SOE chairmen, 40.6% (36.2%+4.4%) of the local SOE chairmen, and 12.1% 
(8.8%+3.3%) of the non-SOE chairmen are unpaid by the listed companies they serve.  
[Table 1] Compensation and Shareholding by Ownership Type and Management Position 
 Central SOEs 
 
Local SOEs Non-SOEs 
CEOs    
Pay + Shareholding 84 (25.3%) 148 (24.1%) 872 (57.1%) 
Pay + No Shareholding 228 (68.7%) 443 (72.1%) 615 (40.3%) 
No Pay + Shareholding 0 (0%) 2 (0.3%) 3 (0.2%) 
No Pay + No Shareholding 20 (6.0%) 21 (3.4%) 35 (2.3%) 
Total 
 
332(100%) 606(100%) 1525(100%) 
Chairmen    
Pay + Shareholding 28 (8.2%) 123 (18.9%) 953(59.9%) 
Pay + No Shareholding 90 (26.5%) 264 (40.5%) 444 (27.9%) 
No Pay + Shareholding 14 (4.1%) 29 (4.4%) 53 (3.3%) 
No Pay + No Shareholding 208 (61.2%) 236 (36.2%) 140 (8.8%) 
Total 
 
340 (100%) 652 (100%) 1590 (100%) 
Independent Directors    
Pay + Shareholding 4 (0.3%) 7 (0.3%) 14 (0.3%) 
Pay + No Shareholding 1032 (87.5%) 1963 (88.5%) 4430 (90.1%) 
No Pay + Shareholding 0 (0%) 2 (.01%) 1 (.02%) 
No Pay + No Shareholding 144 (12.2%) 246 (11.1%) 441 (9.0%) 
Total 
 
1180 (100%) 2218 (100%) 4886 (100%) 
Other Directors (Excluding Chairmen and 
Independent Directors) 
   
Pay + Shareholding 169 (9.8%) 373 (11.4%) 2626 (39.3%) 
Pay + No Shareholding 573 (33.3%) 1485 (43.6%) 2522 (37.7%) 
No Pay + Shareholding 55 (3.2%) 87 (2.7%) 274 (4.1%) 
No Pay + No Shareholding 922 (53.6%) 1325 (40.6%) 1268 (19.0%) 
Total 
 
1719 (100%) 3260(100%) 6690 (100%) 
Supervisors    
Pay + Shareholding 100 (6.8%) 230 (8.2%) 940 (18.1%) 
Pay + No Shareholding 721 (48.9%) 1513 (54.2%) 3299 (63.6%) 
No Pay + Shareholding 24(1.6%) 62(2.2%) 93(1.8%) 
No Pay + No Shareholding 629 (42.7%)  988(35.7%) 854(16.5%) 
Total 1474 (100%) 
 
2793 (100%) 5186 (100%) 
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The zero-pay phenomenon is much less applicable to independent directors. Among the 
independent directors of the central SOEs, only 12.2% of them receive no compensation. A 
slightly lower percentage is shown among the local SOE chairmen (11.2%) and among the non-
SOE chairmen (9.2%). The compensation of independent directors has been fairly standardized 
in which independent directors typically receive a fixed amount of cash payment, with an 
average (excluding zero-pay independent directors) of about $72,000 RMB a year.
37
 The zero-
pay phenomenon is not a result of independent directors as unpaid volunteers.   
For other directors (i.e. directors excluding chairmen and independent directors), the 
zero-pay phenomenon is evident in the data. More than 56% of such directors in the central 
SOEs, 43% in the local SOEs, and 23% in the non-SOEs receive no compensation. Similar to 
directors, 44.3% of the central SOE supervisors, 37.9% of the local SOE supervisors, and 18.3% 
of the non-SOE supervisors earn no compensation.    
Overall, Table 1 shows that a significant percentage of directors and supervisors of the 
listed SOEs particularly those controlled by the central government, report zero in compensation. 
Moreover, most of the zero-pay managers (including directors, supervisors and CEOs) do not 
have any shareholding, which suggests that the zero-pay phenomenon is not a result of 
shareholdings as a substitute for compensation. 
Table 2 further shows the distribution of zero-pay boards of directors by ownership type. 
A significant portion of listed companies, particularly those controlled by the central government, 
demonstrate the board composed of a majority of zero-pay directors. For example, among the 
343 central SOEs, 60 companies (17%) have a board in which between 51 and 60 per cent of the 
directors on the board do not earn any remuneration (no pay and no shareholding) in the listed 
company. Table 2 shows that approximately 27% of the listed companies controlled by the 
                                                          
37
 The average amount is calculated on 7,488 paid independent directors in the author’s dataset.   
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central government have a board dominated a majority of zero-pay directors;
38
 15% for local 
SOEs and only 3% for non-SOEs. 
[Table 2] Structure of the Board of Directors, by Ownership Type 
 
Central SOE 
Boards 
Local SOE 
Boards 
Non-SOE 
Boards 
Percentage of No-Pay Directors on the Board    
0-10% 31 (9%) 133 (20%) 781(49%) 
11-20% 32 (9%) 104 (16%) 370 (23%) 
21-30% 48 (14%) 112 (17%) 186 (12%) 
31-40% 66 (19%) 100 (15%) 116 (7%) 
41-50% 68 (20%) 111 (17%) 77 (5%) 
51-60% 60 (17%) 63 (9%) 40 (2%) 
61-70% 22 (6%) 25 (4%) 13 (1%) 
71-80% 10 (3%) 12 (2%) 4 (0%) 
81-90% 5 (1%) 3 (0%) 8 (0%) 
91-100% 1 (0%) 1 (0%) 6 (0%) 
 
Total 
 
343 (100%) 664 (100%) 1601 (100%) 
 
Similarly, Table 3 shows the distribution of the pay structures of the supervisory boards. 
Again, it clearly shows that the zero-pay boards are mainly concentrated in the state-controlled 
firms – 47% of the central SOEs and 30% of the local SOEs have a supervisory board whose 
majority are zero-pay supervisors.    
[Table 3] Structure of the Board of Supervisors, by Ownership Type 
 
Central SOE 
Boards 
Local SOE 
Boards 
Non-SOE 
Boards 
Percentage of No-Pay Supervisors on the Board    
0-10% 57 (17%) 167 (25%) 1049 (66%) 
11-20% 23 (7%) 50 (8%) 37 (2%) 
21-30% 5 (1%) 14 (2%) 8 (0%) 
31-40% 80 (23%) 195 (29%) 286 (18%) 
41-50% 16 (5%) 32 (5%) 10 (1%) 
51-60% 62 (18%) 76 (11%) 23 (1%) 
61-70% 88 (26%) 113 (17%) 172 (11%) 
71-80% 5 (1%) 7 (1%) 4 (0%) 
81-90% 0 (0%) 2 (0%) 0 (0%) 
91-100% 7 (2%) 8 (1%) 12 (1%) 
 
Total 
 
343 (100%) 664 (100%) 1601 (100%) 
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ii. Causes and Implications 
The large number of zero-pay directors and supervisors, as shown above, warrants an 
exploration of underlying reasons and implications. Why are there so many no-pay directors and 
supervisors? Is their compensation really zero as reported in the annual report?   
The zero-pay phenomenon cannot be adequately explained without looking into the 
network in which the listed firm is embedded.  While ostensibly a large number of directors and 
supervisors are unpaid by the listed companies they serve, they are actually paid by the 
controlling shareholders or other corporate affiliates. As I have noted in previous work, the 
typical approach to the study of Chinese corporate governance takes the listed firm as a stand-
alone unit of analysis.
 39
 This approach certainly generates insights, but it ignores the important 
fact that business groups are pervasive in China and the listed firm is just a subsidiary embedded 
in a web of corporate entities, as earlier illustrated in Figure 2.   
One feature of Chinese business groups is that there are frequent personnel interlocks 
among member firms in a group. Top managers of a member firm such as a listed firm often 
occupy top management positions of other member firms (often non-listed firms) in the same 
group. Such personnel interlocks complicate executive compensation within the group. China’s 
securities regulations require the listed company to explicitly state in its annual report whether or 
not each of the top managers receives any compensation paid by its shareholders or other 
affiliates.
40
 Table 4 summarizes the number and percentage of top managers who are not paid by 
the listed company but instead paid by the listed firm’s shareholders or subsidiaries, according to 
the data disclosed in the 2014 annual reports. 
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 Lin and Milhaupt, supra note 18.  
40
 See Section I.B. 
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[Table 4] Whether or Not Zero-Pay Managers Paid by Shareholders or Subsidiaries 
 Central 
SOEs 
Local  
SOEs 
Non-SOEs Total 
Zero-Pay CEOs     
Paid by Shareholders or Subsidiaries 7 (35%) 6 (26%) 4 (11%) 17(21%) 
Not Paid by Shareholders or Subsidiaries 13 (65%) 17 (74%) 34 (89%) 64(79%) 
Total 
 
20 (100%) 23 (100%) 38 (100%) 81(100%) 
Zero-Pay Chairmen     
Paid by Shareholders or Subsidiaries 112 (50%) 157 (59%) 97 (50%) 366 (54%) 
Not Paid by Shareholders or Subsidiaries 110 (50%) 108 (41%) 96 (50%) 314 (46%) 
Total 
 
222 (100%) 265 (100%) 193 (100%) 680 (100%) 
Zero-Pay Directors (excluding Chairmen)     
Paid by Shareholders or Subsidiaries 473 (42%) 779 (47%) 587 (30%) 1839 (39%) 
Not Paid by Shareholders or Subsidiaries 648 (58%) 871 (53%) 1397 (70%) 2916 (61%) 
Total 
 
1121 (100%) 1650 (100%) 1984 (100%) 4755 (100%) 
Zero-Pay Supervisors     
Paid by Shareholders or Subsidiaries 309 (47%) 594 (57%) 429 (45%) 1332 (50%) 
Not Paid by Shareholders or Subsidiaries 344 (53%) 456 (43%) 518 (55%) 1318 (50%) 
Total 
 
653 (100%) 1050 (100%) 947 (100%) 2650 (100%) 
 
Table 4 suggests that many of the zero-pay top managers are paid by the listed companies’ 
affiliates. It shows that 21% of the zero-pay CEOs, 54% of the zero-pay chairmen, 39% of the 
zero-pay directors (excluding chairs) and 50% of the zero-pay supervisors are paid by the listed 
company’s affiliates, instead of the listed company itself. Still, these numbers based on the 
annual reports are significantly underestimated. The concept of “affiliates” is broadly defined in 
China’s company law, yet in practice Chinese companies improperly narrow the scope of the 
definition and thus underreport compensation by affiliates.
41
 The paying affiliates usually are 
                                                          
41
 According to Section 217 of China’s Company Law, affiliate relationships include the company’s 
relationships with the controlling shareholder, the actual controller, directors, supervisors or senior officers; or any 
direct or indirect control relationship with the company; any other relations that may transfer the company’s 
interests; state-controlled companies are not affiliates simply because of they are owned by the state.  The 
controlling shareholder is any shareholder who owns more than 50% of the company’s shares or any shareholder 
who owns less than 50% but holds enough votes to influence the decisions of the shareholder meeting. The actual 
controller is anyone who is not a shareholder but holds enough influence through equity or contractual relations with 
the company to influence the company’s behavior. Despite this board legal definition, companies in practice limit 
affiliates to the direct controlling shareholder (i.e. the parent company) when reporting whether executives are paid 
by affiliates.  Thus, if an executive is a senior manager of and paid by the parent’s controlling shareholder or 
affiliates controlled by the same parent company, it would go unreported.   
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controlling shareholders (i.e. parent companies). A typical example is as this: The chairman 
(ZHOU Jiping) of PetroChina, a SOE listed on the Shanghai and the New York Stock Exchanges, 
earned no compensation paid by the listed company itself but rather by the parent company 
which is wholly-owned by SASAC. ZHOU simultaneously as the chairman of the parent 
company was subject to SASAC’s pay decision. His compensation was decided behind closed 
doors by SASAC, rather than by the governance institutions (i.e. the board of directors and 
shareholder meetings) of the listed company. This pay arrangement is unobservable from the 
annual report, unless one understands the corporate network and how SASAC wields its control 
over executive compensation. But even if the listed company honestly discloses whether or not 
each of its top managers earns compensation paid by its affiliates, the compensation remains a 
myth to the public as the regulations do not require any disclosure of the amount paid by the 
corporate affiliates.  
  The corporate group structure and the disclosure rules together nicely serve the interests 
of the state-owner. Chinese SOE executive compensation, often riddled with corruption, is a 
politically sensitive issue that the state-owner has been trying to keep it in secrecy. However, it is 
becoming difficult to maintain secrecy for listed companies because of the increasing 
transparency demand in the corporate governance world. It is fair to say that the zero-pay 
phenomenon is a temporary balance between the state-owner’s (or the ruling elite’s) secrecy 
interests and the demand of convergence on internationally-accepted disclosure rules. While the 
Chinese regulators adopt the rule requiring disclosure of each top manager’s compensation paid 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
A prominent example is the chairman (CHANG, Xiabing) of China United Network Communications Ltd. 
has been reported since 2004 in the annual reports that he earned no compensation paid by the listed firm or its 
affiliates. However, CHANG was reported in the annual reports of China Unicom that he was paid by China 
Unicom, an affiliate listed on the New York Stock Exchange. China United Network and China Unicom belong to 
the same business group and owned by the same parent company; China United Network is an indirect controlling 
shareholder of China Unicom. Moreover, there are overlaps in their top management personnel. This is just one 
example. In my data collection process, I noticed that it is fairly common that companies fail to report compensation 
by affiliates.   
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by the listed company, they allow the listed company to hide compensation in its corporate 
affiliates without violating the disclosure rule. 
This information hiding strategy permitted by China’s domestic securities rules is not 
effectively mitigated by cross-listing to international capital markets. Table 5 shows the number 
and percentage of zero-pay managers of the 88 Chinese companies with shares listed both on 
domestic and international stock exchanges. It shows that 8% of the CEOs, 41% of the chairmen, 
31% of the directors (excluding chairmen) and 34% of the supervisors of the Chinese cross-listed 
companies report zero in compensation paid by the listed firm they serve. As previously 
discussed, these zero-pay managers are actually paid in a publicly-unknown amount by the listed 
company’s affiliates. Most of these zero-pay companies are state-owned, including high-profile 
firms such as PetroChina, Sinopec, Chalco and many others simultaneously listed on the 
Shanghai and the New York Stock Exchanges. The Chinese state-owner’s interest in mystifying 
executive compensation remains unharmed despite internationalization of the listed firms.  The 
limited role of international cross-listing in bringing transparency to executive compensation of 
Chinese cross-listed firms partly relates to the regulatory fact that foreign issuers often enjoy lots 
of disclosure exemptions and often compliance with the listed company’s domestic rules would 
be deemed sufficient. The zero-pay phenomenon persistent in cross-listed Chinese companies 
offers another piece of evidence to question whether cross-listing delivers any real positive 
effects on Chinese firms.
42
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42
 Donald Clarke, The Bonding Effect in Cross-Listed Chinese Companies: Is it Real?, GWU Law School 
Public Law Research Paper No. 2015-55,  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2710717.  
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[Table 5] The Zero-Pay Situation among Firms with Shares Listed Overseas 
 Total Number of 
Managers 
(a) 
Number of Zero-
Pay Managers 
(b) 
Percentage of 
Zero-Pay 
Managers 
(b)/(a) 
CEOs 87 7 8% 
Chairmen 85 35 41% 
Directors (Excluding Chairmen) 863 270 31% 
Supervisors 409 138 34% 
 
    
A practical implication of the zero-pay phenomenon is that any measures of top 
management compensation of Chinese listed companies should be taken with great caution. For 
example, as shown in Table 6 below, the average compensation varies significantly with the 
inclusion or exclusion of the zero-pay managers. Unfortunately, existing literature on Chinese 
executive compensation does not make it clear whether the sample includes or excludes zero-pay 
managers.
43
      
[Table 6] Average Pay Differences if Zero-Pay Managers Included or Excluded 
 Including  
Zero-Pay 
[a] 
Excluding  
Zero-Pay 
[b] 
Difference 
(RMB) 
[b-a] 
Difference (%) 
[(b-a)/a] 
Chairmen 
 
545,249 
(2,596) 
 
739, 635 
(1,914) 
194,386 35.7% 
Directors (Excluding Chair) 
 
217,179 
(20,061) 
 
285,286 
(15,272) 
68,107 31.4% 
Supervisors 
 
185,681 
(9,499) 
 
258,100 
(6,834) 
72,419 39% 
Note: Number of managers in brackets. 
 
Fundamentally, the zero-pay phenomenon raises doubt over top managers’ ability to act 
in the best interest of the listed company. The standard approach to the study of executive 
compensation views pay as a solution to the agency problem. Compensation schemes are to 
provide directors and officers with efficient incentives to loyally pursue the interests of the 
                                                          
43
 None of the studies reviewed in Appendix articulates whether it includes or excludes the zero-pay 
executives in data analysis.  
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company that they serve. But the loyalty to the listed company may be in jeopardy when 
directors and officers are not compensated by the listed company itself but by its controlling 
shareholder; what’s worse is that the amount of compensation is a black box to the public. This 
hidden pay arrangement may exacerbate the central governance problem in concentrated 
ownership structure – controlling shareholders exploit minority shareholders. As I recently noted 
in a co-authored work on China’s state capitalism, the state-owner “seeks to maximize a range of 
benefits extending from state revenues to technology prowess and from soft power aboard to 
regime survival at home.”44 In the eye of the state-owner, the individual listed firm’s financial 
interests are subordinate to the country’s interests as defined by the ruling elite. Pay by the 
controlling shareholder rather than the listed firm itself reinforces this interest preference.  
Finally, the zero-pay phenomenon calls for rethinking the meaning of executive 
compensation in the Chinese context. The compensation disclosed in the annual report is the 
amount legally approved by the board of directors and/or the shareholder meeting. It is a 
legitimate financial incentive given to executives. However, are Chinese SOE managers really 
motivated by the legitimate pay or more by something else?
45
 China’s SOE system is full of rent 
seeking opportunities for top managers.  Financial gains are not necessarily in the form of legal 
compensation but illegal payments such as briberies.
46
 Political career advancements may be 
                                                          
44
 Lin and Milhaupt, supra note 18 at 746. 
 
45
  This question is vividly illustrated by the recent comment by the former chairman (WANG, Jianzhou) of 
China Mobile, a SOE listed on the Hong Kong and New York Stock Exchanges. In the Summer Annual Meeting 
(known as Summer Davos) of the World Economic Forum, held in September 2015, WANG as the chairman of the 
Association of China’s Listed Companies commented on executive pay cuts and stated that “To be honest, top 
managers of large SOEs and large enterprises consider a lot of things everyday as they manage tens of thousands of 
employees and they do not really care about the level of personal executive pay.”     
http://economy.caijing.com.cn/20150909/3964095.shtml.   
 46 It was reported that SOE executives accounted for 76% of the 605 cases of entrepreneurs as criminals for 
the year of 2015 alone. The top three crimes for SOE executives were bribery (278 cases), corruption (66) and 
embezzlement (21). The cases have been increasing over the past years. See The 2015 Criminal Report of China’s 
Entrepreneurs, available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/2016-
04/05/content_6551886.htm?node=5955. The report is an annual publication starting in 2009 by Legal Daly, Legal 
Weekly, and China Youth Daily to track criminal records of Chinese entrepreneurs. 
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another form of incentives.
47
 If they are motivated by executive compensation, companies should 
fill in the blank spaces of compensation tables in the annual report.  But if they are actually not 
motivated by executive compensation, then the disclosed pay in the annual report, regardless of 
the amount, does not matter much and it leaves a black hole of what to be disclosed to investors.         
 
C. Nominal versus Actual Pay 
Reporting zero in executive pay is rather intuitively suspicious and should be subject to 
close scrutiny. Still, ostensibly reasonable compensation figures disclosed in the corporate 
annual report can be misleading, particularly for Chinese SOEs. The pay disclosed in the annual 
report sometimes may be a nominal rather than actual amount paid to SOE managers; and the 
gap between the nominal pay and the actual pay can be very large. 
The nominal versus actual pay practice traces back to the overseas listing wave among 
Chinese SOEs in the 1990s. It was created as an expedient solution to the disparity between the 
pay level allowed in China’s state-owned sector and the pay level demanded in the international 
capital market. On the one hand, executive compensation of Chinese SOEs traditionally was 
shockingly low by international standards.  The low pay could raise a red flag on Chinese firms’ 
governance quality and could negatively affect their initial public offering (IPO) price and 
subsequent corporate value in the international capital market. On the other hand, international 
pay practices, especially stock options that often drive compensation high, were incompatible 
with the traditional pay system of Chinese SOEs, whose top managers were often government 
officials and their pay was benchmarked against civil service pay.  In the face of the institutional 
                                                          
 
47
 Jerry Cao et al., Political Promotion, CEO Compensation and Their Effect on Firm Performance, AFA 
2011 Denver Meetings Paper, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1512142 (showing that “both 
monetary and political incentives are positively related to firm performance” and moreover “the monetary 
compensation-based incentive is weaker when CEO incentives are heavily driven by political career concerns”). 
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clashes, Chinese SOEs contrived the appearance of adopting Western-style compensation 
schemes to alleviate the market concerns while at the same time clandestinely making informal 
arrangements with their top managers to maintain the state’s control over compensation.  A 
recent study suggests that stock options granted to executives of Chinese SOEs listed on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange, many of which are also on the New York Stock Exchange, are 
merely window dressing to satisfy the taste of foreign investors.
48
 Executives of Chinese listed 
SOEs are never allowed to freely exercise stock options shown in corporate annual reports; and 
even if exercised, they are expected or required to surrender the gain to the parent company.
49
  
The nominal versus actual pay practice is further institutionalized by SASAC’s 
compensation management beyond its legal authority. SASAC is legally authorized to manage 
executive compensation of the company under its direct ownership (i.e., the parent company 
rather than the listed subsidiary in Figure 2). In reality, SASAC’s compensation management 
power effectively reaches down to the listed subsidiary. Top managers of the listed subsidiary 
who are also executives of the parent company are in fact subject to SASAC’s pay decisions, 
which effectively override the pay approved by the board of the listed company. Available 
information indicates that the actual compensation approved by SASAC and paid to the 
executives can be very different from (usually considerably less than) the nominal pay disclosed 
in the annual report.
50
  This important fact that many SOEs do not receive the pay disclosed in 
                                                          
48
 Zhihong Chen et al., Are Stock Option Grants to Directors of State-Controlled Chinese Firms Listed in 
Hong Kong Genuine Compensation?, 88 ACCOUNTING REV. 1547 (2013). 
49
 Id.  
50
 The actual and nominal pay disparity sometimes may be observed in an inconspicuous footnote of an 
annual report. For example, Poly Real Estate (a listed central SOE) disclosed in a footnote of its 2012 annual report 
that “according to the compensation system approved by the board of directors, the chairman (SONG, Guangju)’s 
total compensation for the fiscal year of 2012 should be 2.8 million; however, according to SASAC’s  decision, the 
pre-tax actual pay is 605 thousand dollars.” The company’s 2013, 2014, and 2015 annual reports stated in a footnote 
that “the chairman’s compensation was unavailable for disclosure because SASAC had not yet completed the annual 
performance review for the chairman.”   
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the annual report but rather a pay internally determined by SASAC is sometimes downplayed as 
a footnote in the annual report or buried in obscure corporate documents, and more often it is 
entirely unstated.  
How SASAC determines SOE executive compensation is opaque, though it has published 
some rules regarding its compensation policy. According to the published rules, the basic 
structure of managerial compensation includes three parts: base salaries, performance bonuses, 
and mid-/long-term incentive compensation. Briefly speaking, the base salary is a function of the 
size of the enterprise, the difficulty level of managing the enterprise, the responsibilities 
undertaken, and the average worker’s pay of the given enterprise, the given industry and the 
given city where the enterprise is located.
51
 Managers receive base salaries monthly. The 
structure and payment of performance bonuses are based on much more complicated formula in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
For central SOEs, CNOOC Ltd, one of the largest state-owned oil companies in China and listed on the 
Hong Kong and New York Stock Exchanges, is the most representative case. CNOOC’s annual reports disclosed 
that several of its top managers were paid multi million dollars (RMB) annually, which aroused public anger in 2009. 
In response, CNOOC clarified that since the first day of the listings in 2001, all the top managers had agreed to 
donate the pay approved by the board of directors to the parent company and they actually received the amount 
determined by SASAC rather than the amount published to the public. According to CNOOC, the difference 
between the actual pay and the nominal pay was like “the sky and the earth.” See CNOOC Reply to Ten Million 
Annual Pay: Actual and Nominal Pay like Sky and the Earth, XINHUA NEWS, April 14, 2009 (reporting the public 
explanation made by CNOOC’s spokesman) at http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-
04/13/content_11180853.htm; CNOOC’s statements were consistent with  information given by SASAC’s officials 
in interviews. See SASAC Experts: Annual Executive Pay at Central SOEs often 400 Thousand Dollars, No One 
Over One Million, CHINA ECONOMIC WEEKLY, Volume 37, Sep.  21 2009. 
For local SOEs, Huayuan Property is the case widely reported in news media. Since 2008, the company had 
disclosed in its annual reports that its chairmen (REN, Jiqiang) earned more than $7 million RMB. In the face of the 
public outcry over the excessive compensation, the company released a formal statement in 2010 explaining Ren’s 
compensation composition and it flagged the fact that Ren’s compensation was determined by SASAC and for the 
fiscal year of 2009, the amount approved by SASAC was less than 700 thousand, only one tenth of the disclosed 
amount in the annual report. See Huanyan Property’s Announcement on Feb. 4, 2010, available for downloads from 
the website of the Shanghai Stock Exchange http://www.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/.   
51
 SASAC published the formula explaining how to calculate managerial compensation, see Zhongyang 
Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Guanli Zanxing Banfa Shixing Xize [Implementation Detailed Rules for Provisional 
Measures on Compensation Administration of Top Managers of the Central State-Owned Enterprises], promulgated 
in 2004. For the CEO or chairman of the enterprise, the function of base salary is: W= W0*L*R. W indicates the 
base salary. W0 indicates 5 times of the average worker’s pay in state-owned enterprises nationwide in the past year. 
L indicates a combination index including the assets size, industry, profits, etc. R indicates a value between 1 and 
1.4 determined by SASAC. 
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which political loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party is a factor.
52
 The performance bonus is 
contingent on the annual performance evaluation and the three-year term review.
53
 However, 
how the SOE executives are actually evaluated and paid under these formal rules remains unclear.     
 
IV. Implications and Questions for Future Research 
A. Implications for Comparative Corporate Governance Scholarship  
The central theme of comparative corporate governance scholarship seeks to explain the 
variance of governance systems around the world. Among various factors, politics has been 
recognized as a key explanation for different national governance regimes.
54
 Nevertheless, the 
mainstream approach to executive compensation pays limited attention to politics.  Most recent 
studies of executive compensation have relied on optimal contracting theory or managerial 
power theory, both of which are developed with a focus on the U.S. experience.
55
 Optimal 
contracting theory assumes that boards are able to bargain with managers and get optimal 
contracts for shareholders’ interests. Managerial power theory, however, argues that the level 
and structure of executive compensation are not shaped by efficient contracting but rather 
distorted by renting seeking managers who are able to capture board members to set their own 
compensation.  However, as leading executive pay scholar Kevin Murphy critically commented 
on the U.S. executive pay literature, 
                                                          
52
 See Zhongyang Qiye Lingdao Banzi he Lingdao Renyuan Zonghe Kaohe Pingjia Banfa [Measures on the 
Comprehensive Performance Evaluation of Top Management Teams and Top Managers of the Central State-Owned 
Enterprises],Dec. 30, 2009;  Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Jingying Yeji Kaohe Zanxing Banfa [Provisional Measures 
on Performance Evaluation of Top Managers of the Central State-Owned Enterprises], SASAC No. [30], 
promulgated on Dec. 29, 2012. 
53
 Id. 
54
 Mark Roe has been a leading advocate for the importance of politics in shaping corporate governance 
systems. See Mark Roe, THE POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL 
CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
55
 Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE 
OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2006). Bebchuk and Fried criticize optimal contracting theory and offer an 
alternative view, managerial power theory. 
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Most recent analyses of executive compensation have focused on efficient-contracting or 
managerial-power rationales for pay, while ignoring or downplaying the causes and 
consequences of disclosure requirements, tax policies, accounting rules, legislation, and 
the general political climate. A central theme of this study is that government intervention 
has been both a response to and a major driver of time trends in executive compensation 
over the past century, and that any explanation for pay that ignores political factors is 
critically incomplete.56  
This observation actually is even truer in the Chinese context. Scholars of Chinese executive 
compensation, like their U.S. counterparts, follow the two prevailing theories. But meanwhile 
they are certainly aware of the important role of government intervention given that the most 
important enterprises in China are state-owned. More often than not, the scholars treat 
government intervention equivalent to binary variables of state ownership (i.e., whether or not 
the firm is owned by the state) or top managers’ political connections (i.e., whether or not the 
firm’s top managers are former or incumbent government officers). This Article adds a new 
dimension of government influence through the lens of disclosure rules. China’s disclosure 
regulations give controlling shareholders great latitude in maneuvering executive compensation 
reporting and ultimately mask the true numbers of executive pay of publicly listed companies. 
The ruling elite’s interest in limiting public scrutiny over its SOE personnel management 
remains largely unharmed despite ostensibly mandatory disclosure of each individual executive’s 
compensation under the securities regulations. The disclosure regime well serves the interests of 
the state-owner (or the ruling elite).   
                                                          
56
 Kevin Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We are, and How We Got There, HANDBOOK OF 
THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE Volume 2, Part A, Chapter 4, Pages 211-356 (2013) Edited by George M. 
Constantinides, Milton Harris and Rene M. Stulz. 
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Another issue relates to comparative corporate governance scholarship is the perennial 
debate about the future trajectory of national corporate governance systems in the era of 
globalization. Will they converge on a universal model or will they continue to retain their 
national characteristics? For executive compensation, its convergence question essentially asks 
whether there is “Americanization” of executive pay – the prevalent use of performance-oriented 
pay and lucrative compensation.
57
 On its face, China seems to present “formal convergence”58 in 
the sense that China’s recent regulations explicitly advocate for performance-oriented pay (such 
as cash bonuses and stock options), a key feature of the U.S. pay paradigm. Moreover, empirical 
evidence based on the formal numbers disclosed in the annual reports of China’s listed 
companies show that while executives earn only a fraction of compensation paid to American 
executives, their compensation has been rising very swiftly.
59
 While the recent formal rules and 
formal pay figures show some changes toward to the U.S. standards, the informal practices 
(including on-duty consumption, the zero-pay practice, and the nominal-actual pay divide) place 
a cautionary note on the substantive meaning of the converging formal rules and formal pay 
figures.  
Related to the convergence debate, the informal pay practices offer an illustration of pay 
reform and “institutional complementarity”60, a concept used by scholars of comparative 
corporate governance to describe that institutions are resistant to change due to institutional 
                                                          
57
 Brian Cheffins and Randall S. Thomas, The Globalization (Americanization?) of Executive Pay, 1 
BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 233 (2004).  
58
 Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 329 (defining “formal convergence” as convergence of rules on the books). 
59
 Alex Bryson et al., Same or Different? The CEO Labour Market in China's Public Listed Companies, 
124 THE ECON. J. 90-108 (2014) (finding that the average total cash and bonus compensation for a top executive in 
2010 was equivalent to US$129,399; and the pay has doubled between 2005 and 2010). 
60
 The leading scholarship of using “institutional complementarities” to compare political economies is 
Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: 
THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1-70 (Peter A. Hall and David 
Soskice eds. 2001). Their idea is that any political economy is composed of several institutions such as corporate 
governance, labor markets, and more. The institutions become functionally complement over time; as a result, the 
institutions are stable and difficult to change.  
Behind the Numbers 
L.Lin 
35 
 
interdependence.  As previously discussed in Section III, the informal pay practices are 
important institutions complementary to the government’s peculiar personnel management in 
which there are frequent rotations between the government bureaus and SOEs. The personnel 
linkages across the government and the SOE sector facilitate the formation and implementation 
of national economic policy and promote coalition among the ruling elite. Because SOE 
executive pay is inextricably tied to personnel appointments, any significant change to the pay 
institution requires a functional adjustment of its interconnected appointment institution. The 
government’s recent SOE reform policy, as discussed below in detail, suggests that the 
complementarity of executive pay and personnel appointment institutions makes pay reform 
more challenging.  
 
B. Implications for Reform Policy 
In recent years, executive compensation has become high on the Chinese SOE reform 
agenda. The Chinese government has promulgated many rules to curb excessive executive pay at 
SOEs. In the wake of the global financial crisis, China’s Ministry of Finance imposed a policy 
where the maximum pre-tax pay at state-controlled financial institutions would be 2.8 million 
RMB.
61
 More recently, amid of the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, the government declared 
that the base salary for central SOE executives is equal to twice of the average worker’s pay; 
annual performance bonus should be no more than twice of the base salary; and on-duty 
consumption should be constrained.
62
 Local SOEs are subject to similar policies as well.
63
 
                                                          
61 Ministry of Finance, Jinrong lei Guoyou ji Guoyou Konggu Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Guanli Banfa 
[Administrative Measures on Top Managerial Compensation of State-Owned and State-Controlled Financial 
Enterprises], Jan. 13, 2009, a summary of the measures available at 
http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengwengao/2009niancaizhengbuwengao/caizhengwengao2009dierqi/20
0904/t20090413_132166.html; for inside information about the rules, see  
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/1040/8771812.html.  
62
 Supra note 23. 
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Overall, the pay reform to date has been focused on the substantive components of compensation 
rather than the decision-making process and transparency.
64
 Indeed, transparency is particularly 
challenging in China’s political environment. Disclosure of SOE executive pay may intensify the 
public’s outrage against economic inequality and political corruption. It touches a nerve with 
China’s ruling elite who are dreadful of any threat to social and political stability.  Furthermore, 
as shown in this Article, even though mandatory disclosure rules of executive compensation are 
in place, it does not necessarily lead to transparency when misrepresentation is actually 
orchestrated by the government out of its own political interests, and gatekeepers including 
lawyers and auditors give way to this political reality. The transparency reform of executive 
compensation in China requires not just releasing numbers to the public but information 
credibility verification and truthful disclosure culture.
65
 Otherwise, the disclosed numbers would 
be just whatever the company (or the state-owner) wants them to appear to the public. 
In the late December 2016, SASAC for the first time disclosed executive compensation 
of the 111 SOEs under its control.
66
 As noted, many zero-pay managers of the listed companies 
are actually paid by the parent companies under SASAC’s control. This disclosure initiative fills 
some information gaps in the zero-pay puzzle. According to the released data, the highest pre-tax 
pay in 2015 was $1.2 million RMB and the executive pay was often between $500,000 and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
63
 Id.  
64
 Tellingly, even the reform rules themselves have no transparency. The government has never published 
the text of the rules but only publicly disclosed a brief summary of the reform policies. While rumors in news 
suggest that the government will soon disclose SOE executive compensation in detail, no progress in this regard has 
been detected.     
65
 SASAC officials sometimes informally in news interviews disclosed fragmented information about SOE 
executive compensation. However, this informal way of disclosure has no comparability and reliability.  
 66 SASAC, Guowuyuan Guoziwei Guanli Qiye Fuzeren 2015 Niandu Xinchou inxi Pilu (国务院国资委管
理企业负责人 2015年度薪酬信息披露), 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n85463/n327265/n327406/n327425/c2513588/content.html.  
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$800,000 RMB.
67
 Although this recent disclosure initiative is an encouraging move towards 
transparency, such disclosure suffers a significant time lag and faces credibility challenges.
68
    
 It is fair to say that all the “behind the numbers” problems are essentially rooted in 
China’s peculiar personnel management. The Chinese Communist Party as the visible hand 
governs the SOE executive labor market. Top managers of important SOEs, like government 
officials, are evaluated and appointed by the Party. In this personnel system, SOE (formal) 
executive pay is benchmarked against civil servant pay and significantly lower than the market 
rates for corporate executives. As a result, SOE executives have incentives to lavishly use on-
duty consumption as a way to compensate for the sense of unfairness. The state-owner 
(ultimately the Party) has interests to maintain its personnel control and secrecy by practicing the 
zero-pay reporting and the nominal-actual pay gap. The Party’s retreat from SOE personnel 
management is the key to successful compensation reform of Chinese SOEs. Unfortunately, until 
today the Party remains unwilling to relinquish this power. While in recent years the government 
has experimented with the idea of recruiting top managers from outside the state sector, my 
recent empirical research shows that the executive labor market of China’s SOEs remains 
virtually closed to those who are outside the state system.
69
 Part of the reason for the absence of 
professionals recruited outside the state system is that the pay is too low compared to the 
prevailing market rate. To handle this problem, the Chinese government is experimenting with a 
dual pay system for SOEs. Under the system, the compensation of executives whose careers 
develop within the state system is unilaterally set by SASAC’s evaluation, while those recruited 
from outside are paid based on market rates through contract negotiation.  The latter 
                                                          
 
67
 Id. The chairman and CEO of the China Merchants Group received the highest pay.  
 
68
 SASAC disclosed the 2015 pay at the end of 2016. Its disclosure time is no contemporaneous with 
annual reporting of listed companies. Moreover, the low executive pay reinforces the common belief that Chinese 
SOE executives do not reply on formal pay but other sources of income (“gray income”).              
69
 Lin, supra note 32. 
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compensation is usually much higher than the former.  It is unclear whether such dualism will 
work well because anecdotal evidence indicates that it can brew resentment among those whose 
pay is subject to SASAC’s relatively low pay policy.70  
 
C. Questions for Future Research 
The primary research methodology of executive compensation literature is quantitative 
analysis of compensation data disclosed in formal corporate reports. The validity of this research 
approach is built on the premise that the numbers published on paper fairly reflect the 
compensation practices in effect. This premise is apt when corporate governance institutions are 
competent and efficient. However, it should be taken with great caution in China’s context where 
the capital market remains relatively immature. Also as scholars of Chinese law commonly note, 
the gap between the law on the books and the law in action is often considerably large in China. 
To be sure, it is unwarranted to entirely deny the credibility of information disclosed in the 
annual reports of China’s listed companies, yet it does reasonably suggest the limitation of 
statistically crunching numbers to understand the true practices of Chinese corporate governance 
including executive compensation. Future empirical research should conduct surveys and 
interviews to get deeper insights in order to fully understand the operation of executive 
compensation in the Chinese context. 
 The findings in this Article suggest another lacuna of existing empirical research on 
Chinese executive compensation:  business groups as a missing variable. A Chinese listed firm is 
often part of a business group and some studies have investigated how the business group 
                                                          
70
 See Beijing News, Forty Percent of the Central SOE Executives Recruited Worldwide are from Inside the 
System, May 2011 (interviewing a SOE CEO who was offered to pay at market rate but declined the offer and 
accepted the lower pay policy because of the potential resentment concern). 
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structure may influence a Chinese firm’s financial performance and accounting behavior.71 Yet 
most existing studies of Chinese executive compensation lack the variable of business group and 
tend to treat the listed firm as a stand-alone unit. How the business group structure may influence 
Chinese executive compensation is an important topic to be explored. A very recent study found 
that executive compensation of a Chinese listed subsidiary is correlated with the performance 
and compensation of another listed subsidiary in the same business group.
72
  
Furthermore, the zero-pay phenomenon raises some specific questions to be investigated 
in the future. For instance, does the lack of financial compensation really impair managers’ 
capability to satisfy their fiduciary duties? Empirically, do companies with a higher percentage 
of zero-pay directors or supervisors on the board demonstrate inferior financial performance, 
more frequent related-party transactions, more sanctions by securities regulators, or any other 
undesirable behavior? Positive answers lend some support to the concerns about fiduciary duties 
while negative answers lead to further inquiries about any other mechanisms that may effectively 
align board members’ interests with the listed company even when they are not paid by the 
company at all. 
 
Conclusion 
In recent years, Chinese executive compensation has received considerable media and 
scholarly attention. News media have annually broadcasted answers to the questions like who are 
                                                          
71
 See e.g., Jia He et al., Business Groups in China, 22 J. CORP. FIN. 166 (2013); Lisa A. Keister, 
Engineering Growth: Business Group Structure and Firm Performance in China’s Transition Economy, 104 AM. J. 
SOC. 404 (1998); Lisa A. Keister, Interfirm Relations in China: Group Structure and Firm Performance in Business 
Groups, 52 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1709 (2009). 
72
 Guilong Cai and Guojian Zheng, Executive Compensation in Business Groups: Evidence From China, 9 
CHINA J. ACCOUNT. RES. 25 (2016) (specifically finding that “when the change in performance of one 
subsidiary is lower than that of the other subsidiaries, the change in its executive compensation is significantly lower. 
Further, when the business group is private and the level of marketization is high, the subsidiary’s executive 
compensation is more likely to be influenced by the performance of the other subsidiaries”). 
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the highest paid CEOs; scholarship has heatedly debated whether there is an excessive pay 
problem; and the government has taken high-profile measures to slash SOE executive 
compensation. Yet, a more than two-decade-old comment on American executive compensation 
in the Harvard Business Review seems apt for the current situation in China – “The relentless 
focus on how much CEOs are paid diverts public attention from the real problem—how CEOs 
are paid.”73 The “how” indeed has Chinese characteristics, rather than merely an issue of 
compensation composition like in the United States and elsewhere. Understanding how Chinese 
executives are paid is a challenging task because it is not a matter simply by crunching the 
numbers released in public companies’ annual reports. A valid reading of formal compensation 
figures entails an understanding of the network structure and the political environment in which 
Chinese companies operate.  
                                                          
73
 Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, THE 
MAY–JUNE 1990 ISSUE, https://hbr.org/1990/05/ceo-incentives-its-not-how-much-you-pay-but-how.  
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Appendix 
Authors  Data 
Years 
Sample Compensation Data 
Mengistae and Xu .2004. Agency Theory and Executive Compensation of Chinese State-
Owned Enterprises, Journal of Labor Economics 22:615-637. 
 
1980s Survey data on about 400 
non-listed Chinese SOEs  
Annual CEO salary and bonuses 
Chong-En Bai and Lixin Colin Xu. 2005. Incentives for CEOs with Multitasks: Evidence 
from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises, Journal of Comparative Economics 33(3):517-
539. 
 
Late 
1980s 
Survey data on more than 
300 non-listed Chinese 
SOEs 
Annual CEO salary and bonuses 
Takao Kato and Cheryl Long. 2006. Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and 
Corporate Governance in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges, Economic Development and Cultural Change. 54(4):945-983.  
 
1998-
2002 
937 listed companies Average of the three highest-paid senior 
managers’ cash compensation 
Michael Firth, Tak Yan Leung, Oliver M. Rui. 2006. Corporate Performance and CEO 
Compensation in China, Journal of Corporate Finance 12(4):693-714. 
 
1998-
2000 
549 non-financial listed 
companies 
Assuming the highest-paid executive’s 
pay as CEO pay 
Michael Firth, Tak Yan Leung, Oliver M. Rui. 2007. How Ownership and Corporate 
Governance Influence Chief Executive Pay in China’s Listed Firms, Journal of Business 
Research 60: 776-785.  
 
1998-
2000 
549 non-financial listed 
companies 
Assuming the highest-paid executive’s 
pay as CEO pay 
Trevor Buck, Xiaohiu Liu and Rodion Skovoroda. 2008. Top Executive Pay and Firm 
Performance in China, Journal of International Business Studies 39, 833-850. 
 
2000-
2003 
601 listed companies in 
2000 
Average of the three highest-paid senior 
managers’ cash compensation 
Ruilong Yang and Jidong Yang. 2009. Why Has Top Executive Compensation Increased 
So Much In China: An Explanation of Peer-Effects. Pacific Economic Review. 14(5): 705-
716. 
 
2001-
2007 
994 listed firms Sum of the three highest-paid senior 
managers’ cash compensation (change in 
the sum between years) 
Michael Firth, Tak Yan Leung, Oliver M. Rui. 2010. Justifying Top Management Pay in A 
Transitional Economy.  Journal of Empirical Finance 15(7)852-866. 
 
2000-
2005 
Non-financial listed 
companies 
Average of the three highest-paid 
executive directors’ cash compensation 
Shujun Ding et al. 2010. Executive Compensation, Supervisory Board, and China’s 
Governance Reform: A Legal Approach Perspective. Review of Quantitative Financial 
Accounting 35:445-471. 
 
2005-
2006 
Listed firms (1,345 
observations in 2005 and 
1,410 in 2006)  
Average and sum of the three highest-
paid executive directors’ cash 
compensation 
Jean Chen et al. 2010. The Effect of Insider Control and Global Benchmarks on Chinese 
Executive Compensation. Corporate Governance: An International Review 18(2):107-123. 
 
2001-
2006 
502 listed companies Sum of the three highest-paid senior 
managers’ cash compensation 
Marin J. Conyon and Lerong He. 2011. Executive Compensation and Corporate 
Governance in China, Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(4):1158-1175. 
 
 
2001-
2005 
Almost all listed firms 
(in both Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges) 
 
 
Sum of the three highest-paid senior 
managers’ cash compensation 
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Tajao Kato and Cheryl Long. 2011. Tournaments and Managerial Incentives In China's 
Listed Firms: New Evidence, China Economic Review 22(1):1-10. 
 
1998-
2002 
 Tier 1 executives: average of the three 
highest-paid senior managers’ cash 
compensation 
 
Tier 2 executives: average of all other 
executives including all directors, 
supervisors, and high-level executives. 
 
Pattarin Adithipyangkul et al.. 2011. Executive Perks: Compensation and Corporate 
Performance in China. Asia Pacific Journal of Management 28:402-425. 
1999-
2004 
 
3,706 year-firm 
observations 
Assuming disclosed expenses on eating, 
traveling, company cars, communication, 
socializing, and entertaining spent for 
management’s personal consumption 
 
Wei Luo et al. 2011. Bank Ownership and Executive Perquisites: New Evidence from an 
Emerging Market. Journal of Corporate Finance 17(2):352-370. 
 
1996-
2006 
All listed firms 
(excluding financial 
industries) 
Perk 1: Regress Mexpense (i.e. Total 
administrative expenses minus bad debt 
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